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FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE 
I. TOWARD A BALANCED JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Rankin v. Howard,l the Ninth Circuit, interpreting a re-
cent Supreme Court decision, held that judicial power exercised 
in the clear absence of personal jurisdiction may give rise to the 
judge's personal monetary liability. The Rankin court made it 
clear that a judge who agrees upon a ruling prior to a hearing is 
not immune from suit. . 
On Christmas Day, 1976, the defendant Judge Zeller held a 
guardianship proceeding upon the application of Wayne How-
ard, an attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Rankin. The Rankins sought 
to have their son, the plaintiff, "deprogrammed"l from his reli-
1. 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Wright, J.; the other panel members were Fer-
guson, J. and Brown, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2020 (1981). 
2. Id. "Deprogramming" is a phenomenon involving the removal of the subject, usu-
ally a cult member, from his or her supportive environment and, while thus confined or 
isolated from other cult members, continually lecturing and cajoling the person in an 
aggreBSive manner, all in an attempt to bring the subject back to "reality." Cult, in this 
context, is defined as "a minority religious group holding beliefs regarded as unorthodox 
or spurious." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 552 (3d ed. 1971). Typi-
cally such "therapy" occurs, after physical abduction of the cult member, in locked motel 
rooms, during marathon sessions by teams of lay "deprogrammers." For the views of a 
veteran of over 1,000 successful "deprogrammings," see T. PATRICK, LET OUR CHILDREN 
Go! (1976). For a comprehensive and generally favorable treatment of "deprogramming" 
policy iBSues, see Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under 
the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. I, 5-6, 88-91 (1977). Criticisms of "deprogram-
ming" abound: Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, 29 CHURCH AND STATE 212 (1977); 
Robbins, Even a Moonie Has Civil Rights, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 1977, at 232. 
Temporary conservatorships and guardianships commonly afford parents the means 
by which to commence "deprogramming." See generally Note, Legal Issues in the Use 
of Guardianship Procedures to Remove Members of Cults, 18 ARIZ. L. REv. 1095 (1976); 
Note, Conservatorships and Religious Cults: Divining a Theory of Free Exercise, 53 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1247 (1978). The use of temporary conservatorships for this purpose has 
ceased in California. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 
(1977). 
187 
1
Clark and Bush: Federal Practice & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
188 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:187 
gious faith.8 Both the plaintiff and his parents resided in Mis-
souri.4 Howard incorrectly stated on the guardianship applica-
tion that the proposed ward resided in Kansas.6 In the 
proceeding, the defendant judge issued an ex parte guardianship 
order.6 Later that day, plaintiff's father flew him to Kansas, os-
tensibly to visit friends.' Howard, also a defendant, and two 
sheriffs met plaintiff and his father at the airport.8 On the au-
thority of the guardianship order, the sheriffs forcibly took 
plaintiff into custody and placed him on a flight to Arizona.· 
There, plaintiff was confined and subjected to "deprogramming" 
for nine days.lo 
Plaintiff sued the participants in the scheme, including 
Judge Zeller, pursuant to three sections of the 1871 Civil Rights 
Act,n and also alleged common law torts. II Plaintiff claimed that 
3. The plaintiff Marcus Rankin is an adult member of the Unification Church 
headed by Reverend Sun Myung Moon. 633 F.2d at 846. One commentator estimates the 
membership of the Unification Church at 300,000-750,000. Delgado, supra note 2, at 6. 
See Life With Father Moon, NBwsWEEK, June 14, 1976, at 60-66; Religious Cults: New-
est Magnet for Youth, U.S. NBws & WORLD RBPORT, June 14, 1976, at 52-54; The Darker 
Side of Sun Moon, TUG, June 14, 1976, at 49. 
4. 633 F.2d at 846. 
5.Id. 
6. Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Ariz. 1978). The order authorized: (1) 
appointment of plaintiff's father as temporary guardian; (2) detention and custody of the 
ward; (3) counseling, examination and treatment of the ward by any person; (4) assis-
tance of any law enforcement officer in the state for the location and detention of the 
ward. Id. The defendant judge is a Kansas probate judge, vested through Kansas stat-
utes with jurisdiction over guardiaDshipa. Id. at 73. He is not a lawyer. Rankin v. How-
ard, 633 F.2d at 846. The proceeding commenced and concluded before the ward entered 
the state. Id. 
7. 633 F.2d at 846. 
8. Brief for Appellant at 18-19. 
9.Id. 
10. 633 F.2d at 846. Attorney Howard, sometimes working with Pima County Assis-
tant District Attorney Trauscht, had apparently used this technique before. See Brief for 
Appellant at 7-8. The plaintiff's confinement occurred first in 8 motel room, then at 
Attorney Howard's home, where plaintiff escaped. Brief for Appellant at 8. 
11. Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Ariz. 1978). Because of the disposi-
tion of the statutory claims, only issues arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) are dis-
cussed in this case note. Section 1983 states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding 
for redress. 
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the defendant judge, prior to the proceeding, agreed to the 
guardianship order and knew of the fraudulent jurisdictional al-
legations.18 Plaintiff claimed the order violated a variety of ex-
press jurisdictional requirements of the Kansas guardianship 
statutes1• and failed to give the proposed ward notice or the op-
portunity to be heard, all in contravention of the United States 
Constitution.11 
The district court granted summary judgment for the defen-
dant judge on all claims.1e The court based its decision on the 
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity from damages liability for 
judicial acts.1' The Ninth Circuit reversed, setting forth several 
significant holdings.1s First, the court stated that a prior private 
agreement on an application's disposition is not a "judicial act" 
for which damages immunity lies. Ie Second, judicial acts com-
For a discU88ion of other iBBues, see note 16 infra. 
12. 633 F.2d at 846. Neither the trial court opinion, Ninth Circuit opinion, nor the 
appellate briefs describe the alleged torts. 
13.Id. 
14. Id. at 847. 
15.Id. 
16. Id. The judge's co-defendants were granted partial summary judgment on a the-
ory of derivative immunity. Id. This immunity applies to private citizens who conspire 
with immune state actors. The theory of derivative immunity disappeared with Dennis v. 
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). Accordingly, this Note win not discuBB any derivative immu-
nity issues. Nor will plaintiff's claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 against the judge's c0-
defendants be analyzed because the significance and focus of Rankin is on judicial 
immunity. 
17. Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. at 73. The doctrine of absolute judicial immu-
nity may be described as the judicial officer's freedom from civil damage suits for judicial 
acts performed within the officer's jurisdiction, if the acts fall within the scope of the 
immunity. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 987 (4th ed. 1971). The adjective "absolute" 
means that the judge's motive, state of mind, or reasonableneBB of conduct is not rele-
vant to the doctrine's application. Id. This definition embodies the discretionary/minis-
terial distinction governing liability for other public officials. Thus, judicial acts are seen 
as discretionary. Id. at 988. Judicial liability for lDinisterial functions is seen in Lynch v. 
Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970). 
A qualified immunity doctrine provides a complete defense for conduct meeting a 
certain standard. See note 90 infra. The most common verbal formula applies immunity 
for such acts committed in good faith, such conduct being reasonable at the time. W. 
PROSSER, supra at 989. For histories of sovereign and judicial immunity, see Feinman & 
Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REV. 201 (1980); Kattan, Knocking 
on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damages 
Actions, 30 VAND. L. REV. 941 (1977); Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the 
United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REv. 827 (1957). 
18. 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980). 
19. Id. at 847. Injunctive or other equitable relief under § 1983 is not barred by the 
judicial immunity doctrine. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 
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mitted in the clear absence of personal jurisdiction are not 
cloaked with immunity.lo Third, a total absence of personal ju-
risdiction may be found when the absence is known to the judge 
or when the judge proceeds recklessly in the face of statute or 
case law prohibiting such action.l• Finally, the Ninth Circuit re-
affirmed the historic distinction between acts in excess of juris-
diction and acts in the absence of jurisdiction. II In effect, the 
court firmly preserved the policy basis underlying immunity for 
excessive acts. II 
B. A CENTURy-OLD BULWARK AGAINST DAMAGES LIABILITY 
Immunity has traditionally been recognized as necessary to 
shield a principled and independent judiciary from intimidation 
and harassment." Among the justifications for immunity are 
that it: (1) prevents influence upon decisions;" (2) saves judges 
from the burden of defending retaliatory suits;l. (3) enhances 
the attractiveness of judicial service;17 (4) promotes finality in 
litigation;l. (5) preserves the appellate process and administra-
tion of justice;11I (6) reflects a duty to society as a whole;lo (7) 
conserves judicial self-protection;l. and, (8) upholds separation 
of powers and federalism. II 
20. 633 F.2d at 848. 
21. 1d. at 849. 
22.1d. 
23.1d. 
24. 1d. at 847. See also, Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) ("(TJhe 
principle, therefore, which exempts judges . . . from liability in a civil action for acta 
done by them in the exercise of their judicial functioDS, obtairus in all countries where 
there is any well-ordered system of jurisprudence."). Justice Douglas enumerated nine 
reasons for judicial immunity in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 n.4 (1967) (diBBenting 
opinion). The Ninth Circuit listed sill. in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 
1965). 
25. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). 
26. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
27. Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day 315, 329 (Conn. 18(4). 
28. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). 
29.1d. 
30. Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1965); Sweeney v. Young, 82 
N.H. 159, 163, 131 A. 155, 158 (1925). The rationale for this justification flows thus: 
Because judges owe no duty to individual litigants and individuals must establish a duty 
not to commit the act, individuals can not establish judicial liability. 
31. Grimm v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 264, 564 P.2d 1227, 1231 
(1977); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative OfficerlJ, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 272 
(1937). 
32. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 564 n.4 (1967). 
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In Bradley v. Fisher,ss the Supreme Court first articulated 
the modern standard of judicial immunity.a. There the Court re-
quired the "clear absence of all jurisdiction" as a condition of a 
judge's civil liability for judicial acts.sa This rule has remained 
essentially untouched until now.se Pursuant to this traditional 
theory, judges who act in excess of the court's jurisdiction, even 
if committed maliciously or recklessly, were immune from civil 
suit.8'7 Three elements figured prominently in the rationale of 
Bradley: (1) judicial independence would be eroded through art-
ful pleading of partiality, corruption, or maliciousness;se (2) ex-
cessive resources would be spent by requiring one judge to an-
swer before another-perhaps one of inferior standing-at the 
behest of a losing party, and forcing judges to preserve every 
item of evidence in every case to later prove their integrity;at 
and (3) respect for the judiciary would be diminished by the ab-
sence of immunity.·o 
33. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). 
34. In Bradley, the plaintiff represented a man accused oC slaying Abraham Lincoln; 
deCendant was the trial judge. At the close oC trial, deCendant removed plaintiff's name 
Crom the role oC attorneys admitted to practice in that court because plaintiff had 
threatened the judge with "personal chastisement." rd. at 344. For his part, plaintiff 
claimed insults directed at him Crom the bench provoked his response. rd. 
Justices Davis and Clifford dissented "Crom the rule laid down by the majority oC 
the court, that a judge is exempt Crom liability in a case like the present, where it is 
alleged not only that his proceeding was in excess oC jurisdiction, but that he acted mali-
ciously and corruptly. If he did 80, he is ... subject to suit the same as a private person 
would be under like circumstances." rd. 
Three years beCore Bradley, Justice Field hinted that judges could be held liable for 
malicious acts in excess of their jurisdiction. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 
536 (1868). The Bradley decision, also by Justice Field, dismissed this implication as 
dictum. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351. 
The Bradley Court also dropped the distinction between courts of general jurisdic· 
tion and courts of inferior jurisdiction for the purposes of immunity from suit. rd. The 
courts of some American states as well as England settled absolute immunity only upon 
superior courts of general jurisdiction, reserving for the lower courts immunity only Cor 
acts committed in good faith-a qualified immunity. Note, Liability of Judicial Officers 
Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 325·27 (1969). 
35. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351. 
36. Only five reported Supreme Court cases have dealt directly with judicial immu· 
nity: Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Alzua 
v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randall 
v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). Only Stump and Pierson address the conflict 
between § 1983 and the judicial immunity doctrine. See Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 
857 n.12 (5th Cir. 1981). 
37. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351. 
38. rd. at 354. 
39. rd. at 349. This requirement would also apply to the second judge. 
40. rd. at 347. 
5
Clark and Bush: Federal Practice & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
192 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:187 
Nearly coincident with the announcement of the Bradley 
doctrine, Congress enacted section 1983u as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871. Congress intended this reconstruction era 
package of legislation as a vehicle to redress misconduct on the 
part of state officials and those acting under color of state law.4J 
Section 1983 and the judicial immunity doctrine of Bradley rep-
resented antagonistic currents in the law. The former sought to 
create liability; the latter to deny it. This tension remained 
largely theoretical until resolved in Pierson v. Ray,4a in which 
the Court held that section 1983 did not disturb the common 
law judicial immunity doctrine.44 
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the 
subject of judicial immunity demonstrates both the longevity 
and vitality of the Bradley rule. In Stump v. Sparkman,fa the 
Court reversed· a Seventh Circuit decision by holding a state 
court judge immune from a section 1983 suit for his ex parte 
order of a minor's sterilization upon the petition of the minor's 
mother.4a The holding of Stump is a vivid example of the mini-
mal showing required to meet Bradley's two prerequisites for 
immunity: a "judicial act" and the lack of a "clear absence of all 
jurisdiction. "., 
The Stump Court outlined two factors which breathe con-
41. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1976). 
42. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-40, 239-40 n.30 (1972) (state courts at the 
time of enactment were being used to deprive citizens of federal rights); Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880) (purpose of § 1983 was to enforce the provisions of the 
fourteenth amendment against all state action-executive, legislative and judicial). 
43. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). A notable exception is Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 
151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945) (Congress possesses power to wipe out common law judicial 
immunity, and did so by enacting § 1983), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 776 (1947). Picking was 
overruled by Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 
(1967). 
44. 386 U.S. at 553-54. 
45. 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
46. The petition alleged that the minor daughter was "somewhat retarded," had 
spent the night with older males and stated the mother's desire to prevent "unfortunate 
circumstances." Id. at 351-52 n.1. The daughter had regularly graduated from grade to 
grade in her public school. Nevertheless, the lower court approved the petition and the 
procedure was performed. Id. at 352. Two years later the minor married. Unable to con-
ceive, the young couple visited a physician, and for the first time learned that the "ap-
pendectomy" performed after the petition was granted was, in fact, a tubal ligation. Id. 
at 353. The petitioner failed to file the petition. The petition did not appear on the 
docket. The minor received no notice, guardian ad litem, or hearing. Id. at 360. 
47. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348, 351. 
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tent into the notion of a judicial act. U A judicial act is either "a 
function normally performed by a judge" (a functional perspec-
tive),49 a situation where the parties have "dealt with the judge 
in his judicial capacity" (an expectational perspective),IIO or some 
admixture of the two. III The Stump Court found both factors in 
the situation before it. liS 
The remarkably informal features of the sterilization pro-
ceedingll3 as set out in Justice Stewart's dissent did not sway the 
majority. The functional factor of the majority's test of a judicial 
act existed because judges commonly "approve petitions relating 
to the affairs of minors, as for example, a petition to settle a 
minor's claim. "11. The court found the expectational aspect based 
on an inference "from the record that it was only because Judge 
Stump served in that position [county circuit court judge] that 
Mrs. McFarlin, on the advice of counsel, submitted the petition 
to him for his approval."1111 While the petitioner undoubtedly ap-
peared before Judge Stump because of his office, such an appli-
cation of the expectational factor is little help in distinguishing a 
proper judicial act from improper overreaching." Clearly, 
Stump means that serious procedural due process errors offer no 
grounds for judicial liability. II' 
The Stump decision is important for its treatment of the 
"clear absence of all jurisdiction" prerequisite of monetary per-
sonal liability for judges. Simply stated, Judge Stump's court 
was not totally devoid of jurisdiction, since apparently no state 
statute or case law prohibited such action.1I8 A general jurisdic-
tional statute empowered the defendant judge to hear "all cases 
at law and in equity whatsoever" and all "causes, matters and 
48. 435 U.S. at 360. 
49. Jd. at 362. 
50. Jd. 
51. Jd. 
52. Jd. 
53. See note 46 supra. 
54. 435 U.S. at 362. 
55. Jd. 
56. Justice Stewart's pithy retort summarizes the objection: "A judge is not free, like 
a loose cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is acting 
in his judicial capacity." Jd. at 367 (footnote omitted). 
57. Jd. at 359. 
58. Jd. at 358. 
7
Clark and Bush: Federal Practice & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
194 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:187 
proceedings."119 By finding the judge's jurisdiction not specifi-
cally foreclosed, the Supreme Court could not find it clearly 
absent.eo 
The dissenters never reached the jurisdictional matter. Jus-
tice Stewart found the judge's conduct nonjudicial and remarked 
that the majority's holding was "based on dangerously broad cri-
teria."el In a separate dissent, Justice Powell focused on the 
nonreviewable quality of the sterilization proceeding as a critical 
fact which distinguished it from the disbarment in Bradley.a" He 
found that· Bradley's foundational policy-namely that private 
rights may be diminished in the greater public interest of an in-
dependent judiciary, and relegated to other forums for their vin-
dication-should not apply to the sterilized minor since she 
lacked appellate or alternative remedies.as 
C. TAILORING AN EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY POLICY 
When the Rankin trial court granted summary judgment for 
the defendant judge, it "assumed that a court arguably having 
subject matter jurisdiction does not act in the 'clear absence of 
all jurisdiction.' "N In deciding an issue of first impression, the 
Ninth Circuit stated that the absence of personal jurisdiction 
constitutes a clear absence of jurisdiction for two reasons." 
First, the requirements of subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion are conjunctional, since both are necessary for lawful adju-
dication." Thus, the absence of either amounts to a total ab-
59. Id. at 357. 
6O.ld. 
61. Id. at 367-68 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
62. Id. at 369. 
63. Id. at 370. 
64. 633 F.2d at 848. 
65.ld. 
66. Id. The Fifth Circuit has apparently adopted a contrary stance as to whether a 
clear absence of personal jurisdiction destroys immunity. In Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 
848 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit interpreted Stump as "extend[ingJ the protection 
of judicial immunity to all 'judicial acts' unless those acts fall clearly outside the judge's 
subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 858 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also id. 
at 860 n.21 (test for judicial immunity is a "judicial act not clearly outside his subject 
matter jurisdiction"). A close reading of Stump indicates that personal jurisdiction did 
not appear as an issue. Thus Stump does not foreclose the colorable presence of personal 
jurisdiction as an element of judicial immunity. While the Harper decision did not deal 
directly with an issue of personal jurisdiction, the court noted "that Stump mandates a 
broad construction of the term 'jurisdiction.''' 1d. at 858 n.16. This expansive interpreta-
tion conforms to the tone of other Fifth Circuit decisions, as set out in note 77 infra. If 
8
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sence of jurisdiction. More importantly, however, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that since "the limits of personal jurisdiction con-
strain judicial authority, acts taken in the absence of personal 
jurisdiction do not fall within the scope of legitimate decision-
making that judicial immunity is designed to protect. "87 The 
presence of immunity is directly related to judicial authority." 
What Stump only intimated concerning proof of jurisdic-
tional issues, the Rankin court expressed. The Ninth Circuit 
held that when the defendant judge either knew the jurisdic-
tional pleadings to be false, or proceeded in the face of valid 
statutory or case law denying him jurisdiction, proof of the lack 
of jurisdiction is met.89 It is fundamental that a court has juris-
diction to determine its jurisdiction,70 but that alone does not 
confer immunity. For an erroneous, but well-founded, determi-
nation, no liability exists.71 
In Rankin, the Ninth Circuit applied the expectational and 
functional factors articulated in Stump to conclude that prede-
termination of a guardianship petition is a nonjudicial act. First, 
the Ninth Circuit noted the proposed ward's expectation of judi-
cial impartiality was frustrated.71 Second, the appellate court 
this is the view of the Fifth Circuit, a conflict among the circuits awaits Supreme Court 
resolution. For criticism of the expansive theory of judicial immunity, see text accompa-
nying note 77 infra. The impact of Harper on the "judicial act" analytical strand is also 
discussed at note 77 infra. 
67. 633 F.2d at 849. 
68. In a recent case, O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1981), the 
Ninth Circuit applied the distinction between excessive jurisdiction and absence of juris-
diction for immunity purposes in an interpretation of Rankin. In O'Neil, the defendant 
judge apparently mistook a bench warrant for an indirect contempt of court charge and 
sentenced plaintiff to two days in jail. Id. at 368. An indirect contempt charge is one 
based on events outside the view of the judge entering judgment.ld. An affidavit making 
the charge and describing the events is expressly required by state law. Id. No such 
affidavit existed prior to the entry of judgment. Id. Plaintiff won compensatory and pu-
nitive damages against defendant under § 1983. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding 
that judicial immunity prevented suit. The defendant judge's failure to comply with the 
procedural requirements for an indirect contempt charge prior to sentencing, though a 
judicial act, reflected an act in excess, not absence, of jurisdiction. Id. at 369. The trial 
court had erroneously believed that the imperfect discharge of statutory duties confer-
ring jurisdiction over indirect contempt hearings amounted to a clear absence of jurisdic-
tion.ld. 
69. 633 F.2d at 849 n.14. 
70. United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330·U.S. 258 (1947); C. WRIGHT, 
LAW or FEDERAL COURTS 57-58 (3d ed. 1976). 
71. 633 F.2d at 849. 
72. Id. at 847. 
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recognized that an agreement to make a particular ruling in ad-
vance is not a "function normally performed by a judge."" 
Rather, it is the opposite of that which judicial immunity seeks 
to protect-i.e., "principled and fearless decisionmaking.''''· 
The Ninth Circuit's formulation appears to have adopted 
Justice Stewart's definition of a judicial act.n Justice Stewart 
recommended that "the concept of what is a judicial act must 
take its content from a consideration of the factors that support 
immunity from liability for the performance of such an act.''''· 
Though the Ninth Circuit accomplished a verbal blending of the 
two views, its application of the critical factors implies the pri-
macy of Justice Stewart's suggestion." An earlier opinion by the 
Rankin court strengthened this interpretation" when it stated 
73.1d. 
74.1d. 
75. Id. n.8 ("[W]e do not believe that the majority meant to deny the relevance of 
the doctrine's purpose in determining its scope."). 
76. 435 U.S. at 368. 
77. 633 F.2d at 847. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a virtually limitless view of what 
makes a judicial act. Harper v. Merckle. observed: 
Thus we take as settled law the proposition that [in] the vast 
mlijority of section 1983 cases in which judges are named as 
defendants, judicial immunity will bar the action. Moreover. 
as our analysis' . . . reveals. we can envision no situa-
tion-where a judge acts after he is approached qua judge by 
parties to a case-that could possibly spawn a successful sec-
tion 1983 suit. 
638 F.2d 848, 856 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original). 
In McAlester v. Brown. 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit reflected this 
view of judicial immunity. Pertinent comments include the following: 
We note in concluding that the opening of any inroads 
weakening judicial immunity could have the gravest conse-
quences to our system of justice .... To be sure. we can con-
jure converse chambers of horrors. but we cannot allow that to 
erode the necessary features of the immunity. That judicial 
immunity is sometimes used as an offensive dagger rather 
than a defensive shield must not justify derogating its inviola-
bility. Even though there may be an occasional diabolical or 
venal judicial act, the independence of the judiciary must not 
be sacrificed one microscopic portion of a millimeter, lest the 
fears of section 1983 intrusions cow the judge from his duty. 
Id. at 1283 (footnote omitted). 
In Harper. the Fifth Circuit claimed that the McAlester decision is the source of the 
Stump factors. Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d at 858. A view of judicial immunity that 
vests upon such an intangible definition of judicial act cuts the doctrine free from its 
policy bases. See notes 25-32 supra and accompanying text for the policies behind judi-
cial immunity. 
78. Gregory v. Thompson. 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974). The Gregory court held the 
10
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that" [w ]hat constitutes conduct falling within that range [of ju-
dicial acts] must, in large part, be determined by looking at the 
purpose underlying the doctrine of judicial immunity."'· 
D. ANALYSIS 
Neither controversy nor fear of reprisal should deter a court 
from undertaking a difficult jurisdictional question. Neither 
Rankin nor Stump enunciated the requisite quantum of juris-
dictional certainty. The Rankin court, however, stood by the 
proposition that the bedrock basis for judicial action-a tenable 
claim to jurisdiction over the cause and over the parties-must 
be met under the state of the law as it then exists in order to 
preserve judicial immunity. The inadequacy of Stump results 
from the lack of direction it affords lower courts.IO By resting 
the decision on a broad jurisdictional statute, the Supreme 
Court failed to delineate outer limits to action by a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction. The Rankin decision took a long stride toward 
curing that defect. 
By juxtaposing the expectational and functional factors of a 
judicial act against the policy need for judicial immunity, the 
Ninth Circuit shaped a clearer doctrine, more keenly attuned to 
the section 19S3/Bradley conflict. Both parties to a court pro-
ceeding expect fair and even treatment at the hands of the judi-
ciary. The Ninth Circuit recognized the importance of the two 
perspectives. In contrast, the Stump Court overlooked the ex-
pectations of the sterilized minor.11 Like the grant of jurisdiction 
in Stump. the probate statutes of Kansas clearly gave the defen-
defendant judge. who assaulted the plaintiff while ejecting him from the courtroom. was 
entitled to a qualified immunity. Since the judge could have directed the baliff to evict 
plaintiff. and the bailiff enjoyed immunity if he acted in good faith even while using 
excessive force. the judge could claim bailiff's immunity. Id. at 64. 
79. Id. at 63. 
80. See Rosenberg. Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity, 64 VA. 
L. REV. 833 (1978); Comment. Judicial Immunity: An Unqualified Sanction of Tyranny 
from the Bench? 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 810 (1978); 47 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 81 (1978). 
In the context of legislative immunity. the Supreme Court has stated that the doc-
trine of immunity should not be applied broadly. but should be invoked only to the 
extent necessary to effect its purpose: "[Tlhe Court has not fashioned a fixed. invariable 
rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry into whether the contributions of 
immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the perhaps recurring 
harm to individual citizens .... " Doe v. McMillan. 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1972). 
81. 435 U.S. at 363. 
11
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dant judge in Rankin authority to order guardianships.aa But 
the Ninth Circuit's determination that the judge exceeded his 
functional role is premised on less literal, more realistic, consid-
erations. Private agreements which conclude before causes com-
mence diminish respect for the judiciary. In recognizing this, the 
Rankin court achieved a more incisive use of the expectational 
and functional factors. 
E. A MODEL THEORY OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
An ideal theory of judicial immunity protects judicial of-
ficers from civil reprisal for decisions made upon their well-con-
sidered convictions. Courts have constantly narrowed the scope 
of immunity in the legislative and executive branches to confine 
it within only the salutory bounds required.sa While it is unfair 
to describe the doctrine of judicial immunity as a "judicial re-
peal of the Civil Rights Act,"'· it is wise to recognize the virtues 
of accountability which that section contemplates.81 
Arguably, those features of the judicial system that are es-
sential to a shared concept of fairness and respectability in pub-
lic opinion should be protected by a doctrine of judicial culpabil-
ity. Such features might include the following: (1) notice and an 
opportunity to be heard for final adjudications," (2) a colorable 
82. 633 F.2d at 846 n.5. 
83. Compare Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (executive officers performing 
adjudicatory functions entitled to absolute immunity for that function only, because fea-
tures of the judicial process enhance reliability and impartiality-citing as safeguards, 
adversarial procedure, right to appeal, cross-examination and use of precedent) with 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state governor has qualified immunity) and Im-
bler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for state prosecutor's perform-
ance of "judicial" duties, leaving unanswered the question of liability for administrative 
duties). See also Jaffe, Suits Against GOllernments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 
HARv. L. REv. 209 (1963); Note, Federal Executille Immunity From Civil Liability in 
Damages: A Reellaluation of Barr v. Matteo, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (1977). 
84. If the courts held that all state officials had immunity from 
liability under Civil Rights actions for all acts done or com-
mitted within the ostensible scope of their authority, this 
would practically constitute a judicial repeal of the Civil 
Rights Act. Repeal is the responsibility of Congress, not the 
courts. 
Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 299-300 (9th Cir. 1959). 
85. For an interesting, sometimes amusing, discussion of the range and impact of 
judicial misconduct, see Note, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal 
for Limited Liability, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 549, 555-63 (1978) and citations therein. 
86. Rosenberg, supra note SO, at 835 (Stump rejected procedural due process and 
nonreviewability as limits on the immunity doctrine. Lack of adversary hearing should 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/8
1982] FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 199 
claim to personal and subject matter jurisdiction,'? (3) a right to 
appeal,88 (4) freedom from prejudgment and partiality," and (5) 
a written record. For the denigration of these fundamental ele-
ments of the American judiciary, monetary liability may be an 
effective deterrent. A policy of qualified immunity for the judici-
ary-thereby introducing state of mind as a relevant fac-
tor-would seriously erode the benefits realized by an immunity 
doctrine.eo Judicial immunity policy must seek to nurture deci-
sions based on judicial conviction, but not to insulate lawless-
ness from civil redress. e1 The Rankin decision is just such an 
effort. 
Tom C. Clark 
be seen as jurisdictional defect.). 
87. Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2020 
(1981). 
88. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 370 (1978) (Powell, J., di88enting). 
89. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (due proceBB right to a 
judge who has not prejudged case); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (due pr0ce88 
right to a disinterested judge). Accord, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
90. Among the many articles favoring a qualified immunity, the best include: Theis, 
Official Immunity and the Civil Rights Act, 38 LA. L. REv. 279 (1978); Note, supra note 
85 (proposal modelled on Judicial Immunity Tenure Act); Note, Immunity of Federal 
and State Judges from Civil Suit-Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. REs. L. 
REV. 727 (1977) (mechanisms for enforcing an actual malice standard); Note, Quasi·Ju· 
dicial Immunity: Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95 
(1976) (all public officials exercising discretion deserve a "good faith" immunity absent 
evidence that it imposes an undue restraint upon performance); Note, Liability of Judi· 
cial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969) (favoring an actual malice 
standard similar to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
Justice Douglas also appeared to favor qualified immunity: 
The presence of malice and the intention to deprive a person 
of his civil rights is wholly incompatible with the judicial func· 
tion. When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to de· 
prive a person of his constitutional rights he exercises no dis· 
cretion or individual judgement; he acts no longer as a judge, 
but as a "minister" of his own prejudices. 
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 567 n.6 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
91. French judicial officials are liable to harmed litigants for the intentional or negli· 
gent discharge of their duties. The statutory 8cheme for recovery is praised by some 
writers for its built·in filtering of frivolous claims. See, Note, Tort Liability: Search 
Warrant Quashed: Protection Order Denied: Magistrate Negligent: Consideration of 
Judicial Immunity: Possible Alternatives: French System: Malice and Negligence Stan· 
dard: Re Yoner, 7 D.L.R. 3d 185 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1969), 4 OTToWA L. REv. 627, 630·31 
(1971) (citing H. SOLUS, I DROIT JUDlCIAlRB PRiVE 704·11 (1961». The standard of care 
demands that "serious professional error" occur before recovery is allowed. Note, supra 
note 85, at 589. 
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II. DAVIS v. UNITED STATES: ACCRUAL OF A CLAIM 
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Davis v. United States, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that once 
a plaintiff learns of the facts of both his injury and its likely 
cause, the two-year statute of limitations under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (the Act) begins to run. The decision has the unfor-
tunate effect of forcing plaintiffs to sue before legal causation 
can be shown and may result in the forfeiture of some meritori-
oUs claims. 
In March 1963, an immunization clinic administered Sabin 
Type III oral polio vaccine to plaintiff as part of a government-
initiated, mass immunization program to control poliomeylitis.' 
Thirty days after vaccination, plaintiff became paralyzed from 
the waist down. a He sued Wyeth Laboratories, the manufacturer 
of the vaccine, in 1964.4 During this litigation, it was revealed 
that the Division of Biological Standards (DBS) had tested the 
lot from which plaintiff's vaccine was taken and found it within 
acceptable limits. II This litigation culminated in an appeal and 
the remand of the case for retrial on a strict liability theory.' 
The plaintiff alleged that, in 1973, he learned of another 
DBS test of the vaccine,7 the results of which fell outside the 
1. 642 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Menill, J.; the other panel members were Tang, 
J., dissenting, and Schroeder, J.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1982). 
2. Id. at 329. The immunization program stemmed from the Vaccination Assistance 
Act of 1962 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 247b (1976». 
3. 642 F.2d at 329. 
4. Id. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). 
5. 642 F.2d at 329-30. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., defendant Wyeth Labo-
ratories deposed Dr. Ruth Kirschstein, chief of the pathology section of the laboratory of 
Viral Immunology, DBS, and subpoenaed her to bring all records of DBS relating to lot 
no. 03503 of the Sabin Type III oral polio vaccine. DBS had subjected each lot of vaccine 
to various tests. Dr. Kirschstein produced records of only a single neurovirulence test. Id. 
at 329. 
The test involved giving the vaccine to monkeys and then examining their brains for 
lesions. If the number of lesions fell within DBS standards, the lot was acceptable. The 
test on lot no. 03503 indicated that only two of the thirty monkeys developed lesions and 
the lot was classified as acceptable. Id. at 329 n.2, 330 n.3. 
6. 399 F.2d at 131. 
7. 642 F.2d at 330. The plaintiff alleged that he learned of another test conducted 
on lot no. 03503 from an attorney representing a plaintiff in another suit, Griffin v. 
United States, 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974). 
14
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acceptable range. s Because Congress charged DBS9 with testing 
and licensing the manufacturer of the vaccine,l° plaintiff also 
sued the government under the Act.11 
The district court granted summary judgment for the gov-
ernment and held that the Act's two-year statute of limitations 
barred recovery.12 On appeal, plaintiff contended that his cause 
of action did not accrue until 1973, when he learned of facts in-
dicating the government's responsibility for his paralysis. He 
contended, in the alternative, that the government's fraudulent 
concealment of the results of the second test tolled the statute. 18 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE "DISCOVERY RULE" 
The general rule of tort law is that a claim accrues for stat-
ute of limitations purposes at the time of the plaintiff's injury.14 
8. 642 F.2d at 330. This test revealed that one of the monkeys developed lesions 
that were unacceptable under DBS standards. ld. n.S. 
9. DBS was part of the National Institute of Health, United States Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. It was transferred to the Food and Drug Administration 
and renamed the Bureau of Biologies in 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 12,865 (1972). Current au-
thorization at 21 C.F.R. § 5.68 (1980) provides: 
The Director and Deputy Director of the Bureau of Bio-
logies ... are authorized to issue licenses under section 351 of 
the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 262) for propaga-
tion or manufacture and preparation of biological products as 
specified in the act, and to revoke such licenses at the manu-
facturer's request. 
10. 42 C.F.R. § 73.110 (1971) (current version at 21 C.F.R. § 630 (1980» prescribes 
standards for testing viral vaccines such as poliomeylitis, rubella, smallpox, and measles. 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The United States shall be 
liable ... , in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive 
damages." 
Congress enacted the Act to eliminate the burden of providing relief through private 
bills to victims of government negligence and to create a remedy that would achieve a 
more equitable result in tort actions against the United States. See S. REP. No. 1400, 
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 7 (1946). 
12. The Act specifically provides: 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever 
barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Fed-
eral agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless 
action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by 
certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the 
claim by the agency to which it was presented. 
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). 
13. 642 F.2d at 330. 
14. In the usual case, the fact of injury provides a plaintiff with adequate notice of 
the cause of the injury and of the possibility that a legal wrong has occurred. See RE-
15
Clark and Bush: Federal Practice & Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
202 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:200 
Because the general rule was recognized as being unjust and un-
necessarily harsh,lII it has been modified in medical malpractice 
claims to delay accrual of the claim until the plaintiff, through 
due diligence, discovers the injury. Ie 
Lower courts have further extended this discovery rule to 
forestall accrual until the plaintiff discovers, or, in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, should discover I both the injury and its 
cause. I" In United States v. Kubrick,18 the Supreme Court 
adopted this extension of the discovery rule. III The Court found 
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comment c at 441 (1977). 
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971). See also Gott-
lieb & Young, Medical Malpractice and Limitations Under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, 13 Du. L.J. 257 (1964); Sacks, Statutes 01 Limitations and Undiscovered Malprac-
tice, 16 CLBV.-MAR. L. REv. 65 (1967). 
16. In Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), the Court held that a claim under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act did not accure until a plaintiff's injury manifested it-
self. The court stated that the plaintiff was not barred by the statute of limitations 
because: 
It would mean that at some past moment in time, unknown 
and inherently unknowable even in retrospect, Urie was 
charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration 
of his lungs [by silocosis); under this view Urie's failure to di-
agnose within the applicable statute of limitations a disease 
whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness 
would constitute waiver of his right to compensation at the 
ultimate day of discovery and disability. 
We do not think the humane legislative plan intended 
such consequences to attach to blameless ignorance. 
rd. at 169-70. 
In Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962), the Fifth Circuit applied 
Urie to medical malpractice claims under the Act, stating, "[w)e can see no sound reason 
for permitting the Government to escape liability here simply because its alleged negli-
gence was such as to remain undiscovered and, practically speaking, undiscoverable, for 
many years thereafter." rd. at 241. 
17. This rule was followed in the Ninth Circuit and other circuits. Exnicious v. 
United States, 563 F.2d 418 (1Oth Cir. 1977); Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978 
(4th Cir. 1977); Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1975); Jordan v. United 
States, 503 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1974); Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962), overruled on other grounds, 
Ramirez v. United States, 567 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1977). 
18. 444 U.S. 111 (1979). 
19. In Kubrick, the plaintiff was treated with neomycin at a Veteran's Administra-
tion (VA) hospital for an infection of the right femur. Irrigation of the infected area with 
neomycin led to a ringing sensation and loss of hearing six weeks later. An ear specialist, 
who had secured Kubrick's records from the VA, advised him that the hearing loss might 
be due to the neomycin treatment. The plaintiff did not file claim against the govern-
ment until later when another physician advised him that the neomycin had caused the 
injury. The Court held that accrual occurred when the plaintiff was informed of the pas-
16
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that once a plaintiff learns of his injury and its cause, he is no 
longer at the mercy of a defendant who has knowledge of these 
critical facts. 2o The Court, however, reversed an additional ex-
tension of the rule by the court of appeals, and held that accrual 
cannot be deferred until a plaintiff learns of a defendant's negli-
gence or legal fault.n 
C. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Majority Opinion 
In Davis, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment 
and held that the Act's two-year statute of limitations barred 
the action.23 The panel noted that the Kubrick Court refused to 
defer accrual until plaintiff discovered that defendant was le-
gally at fault.3S The court stated that, "[wlith knowledge of the 
fact of injUry and its cause, the malpractice plaintiff is on the 
same footing as any negligence plaintiff" and that the burden is 
on the plaintiff to ascertain the existence and source of fault 
within the statutory period.34 Consequently, the Davis court de-
cided that the question of plaintiff's diligence or lack of dili-
gence in proving fault was irrelevant,n because the statute 
would begin to run in either event. The court stated that 
Kubrick had made clear that once a plaintiff knows of his injury 
and its cause, the decision to sue must be made within the statu-
tory period.36 The Davis court found that in April 1963, plaintiff 
knew of his injury and that the vaccine was the likely cause; or 
sibility that the neomycin caused his injury, Dot when he learned that the doctor who 
had caused his injury was legally responsible. 1d. at 113-23. 
20. 1d. at 122. The Kubrick Court refers to a plaintiff being in "possession of the 
critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury." 1d. Although this 
would appear to imply discovery of a person at fault, it is apparent from the Kubrick 
decision that the Court means only discovery of the cause of injury. 
21. 1d. at 121-22. The lower court had reasoned that if a claim does not accrue until 
a plaintiff is aware of his injury and its cause, neither should it accrue until he knows or 
should suspect that the doctor who caused his injury was medically negligent. Thus, the 
court extended accrual until discovery that an injury was negligently inflicted. 581 F.2d 
1092, 1097 (3d Cir. 1978). 
The Supreme Court stated in reversing: "[wJe are un convinced that for statute of 
limitations purposes, a plaintiff's ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the 
fact of his injury or its cause should receive identical treatment." 444 U.S. at 122. 
22. 642 F.2d at 330, 332. 
23. 1d. at 331. 
24.1d. 
25.1d. 
26.1d. 
17
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that, at the latest, he knew this when he sued Wyeth Laborato-
ries in 1964/~7 The court, therefore, concluded that the claim ac-
. crued at the time of injury.ls 
The court also found that the government's concealment of 
the results of the second test was not fraudulent and did not toll 
the statute.lI9 It held that the two-year statute had run, and that, 
although the government's failure to report a link between the 
vaccine and subsequent cases of polio might have been negli-
gent, the failure was insufficient to constitute fradulent conceal-
ment,80 and affirmed the defendant's summary judgment.81 
The Dissent 
Judge Tang dissented and indicated that the record failed 
to support the majority's assumption that the plaintiff was 
aware of his injury and its cause in April 1963.a• He focused on 
the Kubrick Court's statement that the statute of limitations be-
gins to run only when the plaintiff is in "possession of the criti-
cal facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the in-
jury. "aa Judge Tang examined the record to determine when 
plaintiff knew the facts of his injury and its cause." The dissent 
found that plaintiff was hospitalized until October 1963, and 
that it was unclear when plaintiff recovered sufficiently to be 
aware of anything, although the record indicated that he had 
wondered in the summer of 1963 whether the vaccine had in-
duced his paralysis. ao The record showed that, at the earliest, 
plaintiff searched for the cause of his injury in October 1963. 
The dissent concluded that, from the record available, the ques-
tion of when the plaintiff had determined the cause of his injury 
should be a factual determination for the jury." 
27. rd. n.9. 
28. rd. at 331. 
29. rd. at 332. 
30. rd. at 331-32. 
31. rd. at 332. 
32. rd. 
33. rd. (emphasis supplied) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122). 
34. 642 F.2d at 332. 
35. rd. 
36. rd. at 333. The dissent thoroughly examined the record that was available, citing 
the Clerk's Transcript and letters that the plaintiff had written to various agencies and 
doctors inquiring about the causal link between the vaccine and his paralysis. rd. at 332-
33. 
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D. CRITIQUE 
Although the majority correctly analyzed Kubrick regarding 
a plaintiff's discovery of legal fault, the court failed to apply 
Kubrick's ruling that the statute of limitations begins to run 
only when the plaintiff possesses the critical facts of his injury 
and its cause. As pointed out in the dissent, the majority as-
sumed, without examining the record, that the plaintiff was 
aware of his injury and its cause. 
The majority thus misapplied Kubrick by (1) not addressing 
the issue of when the plaintiff possessed the critical facts, and 
(2) not examining the record. Although the Kubrick Court de-
cided not to extend the discovery rule to defer actual accrual 
until discovery of legal fault, it did affirm an extension of the 
rule to defer accrual until a plaintiff was in possession of the 
critical facts.87 
Other circuits have followed Kubrick in accrual questions.as 
Unlike the majority in Davis, these circuits have based their 
opinions upon an analysis of the record to determine when 
plaintiff came into possession of the critical facts. 
One recent Seventh Circuit decision, Stoleson v. United 
States, at provides a sharp contrast to Davis in its application of 
Kubrick. In Stoleson, plaintiff sued under the Act and alleged 
heart problems resulting from employment in an ammunition 
plant where she was exposed to nitroglycerin.40 She suffered a 
37. 444 U.S. at 122. 
38. Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1980); Stoleson v. United States, 629 
F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980); Waits v. United States, 611 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1980). 
In Wollman, plaintiff sued defendant for injuries sustained in an automobile acci-
dent. Because defendant was a federal employee, the case was removed to federal district 
court where it was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run. The Eighth 
Circuit held that plaintiff was barred becaused the claim accrued at the time of the 
accident when he was aware that the defendant was a federal employee and could not be 
deferred until he discovered the legal significance of this fact. 
In Waits, plaintiff sued the VA for negligence which he alleged resulted in the am-
putation of his leg. The government contended he was barred by the statute of limita-
tions but the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff's failure to discover the specific acts of 
negligence that caused the amputation rested with the VA because it delayed in produc-
ing the records of the plaintiff's treatment. Thus, plaintiff was not barred. 
39. 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980). 
40. Id. at 1266-67. The plaintiff had worked at the Badger Army Ammunition Plant 
(BAAP). "During the relevant period the Olin Corporation operated BAAP pursuant to a 
cost plus fixed fee contract. The district court found that the Government had pervasive 
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heart attack in 1968 and suspected a link with the nitroglycerin, 
but was informed by physicians that the exposure was not the 
cause of her heart trouble.u In April 1971, a second, more au-
thoritative opinion related her heart problems to nitroglycerin 
exposure.4lI The district court dismissed the suit, brought in 
1972, as barred by the two-year statute of limitations.48 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that, under the Act, the statute began to run, 
not when the plaintiff first suffered severe anginal attack or 
when she suspected that nitroglycerin was the culprit, as the 
lower court had held,4. but only when the second physician in-
formed her of the cause and effect relationship between nitro-
glycerin exposure and the heart problem.411 
To reach its decision, the Seventh Circuit relied on Kubrick, 
reasoning that U[u]nderlying Kubrick is the recognition that a 
plaintiff armed with knowledge of his injury and its cause is no 
longer at the mercy of a defendant's specialized knowledge. A 
plaintiff in that position need only inquire of other professionals, 
including lawyers, whether he has been legally wronged."4' The 
Stoleson court examined the record and found that a layperson's 
subjective belief is insufficient knowledge of causation to trigger 
the statute of limitations.4" The court stated that the plaintiff 
would have been advised that she had no cause of action against 
the government had she sought legal advice after first suspecting 
nitroglycerin had caused her heart problems.41 Accordingly, the 
plaintiff's suspicion did not ripen into knowledge of the missing 
critical fact of causation until after she consulted a physician'" 
Like the plaintiff in Stoleson, Davis at first merely sus-
pected the polio vaccine caused his paralysis. This, according to 
Stoleson, was a layperson's subjective belief. Davis was also in-
formed that no casual connection could be proved between the 
influence and authority over Olin and that the Government therefore shared with Olin 
whatever duties Olin owed to its employees." Id. at 1266 n.l. 
41. Id. at 1267. 
42.1d. 
43. rd. 
44. rd. at 1270. 
45. Id. at 1270-71. 
46. rd. at 1269-70. 
47. rd. at 1270. 
48.1d. 
49. rd. 
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vaccine and his paralysis. lio But the Davis court never examined 
the record to determine when the plaintiff's suspicion ripened 
into knowledge of causation. It also never addressed the issue of 
the second vaccine test or the possibility that it might have been 
a missing, critical fact in plaintiff's knowledge of the cause of 
injury. 
The thorough analysis of an accrual question by Stoleson 
applies the Kubrick holding more aptly than does the majority 
opinion in Davis. Even though the Kubrick Court did not allow 
the plaintiff's claim to accrue once he learned that neomycin 
treatment had caused his hearing loss, it did examine the record 
thoroughly to determine when plaintiff learned of the cause of 
his injury .111 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Kubrick Court's decision not to extend the discovery 
rule to include discovery of legal wrong has been viewed as a 
cutback of the liberal construction of the discovery rule. III This 
cutback has been made more harsh by the Ninth Circuit in Da-
vis. The failure to apply Kubrick to the ,facts of plaintiff's claim 
has resulted in a ruling that the claim accrued at the time of 
injury and was barred by the statute of limitations, even though 
the question of causation was still in doubt. The Kubrick Court 
stated that a strict construction of the statute would have a jus-
tified effect in malpractice cases because a plaintiff who learns of 
his injury and its cause need only seek competent advice on 
whether to sue.1I1 Unfortunately, the Davis interpretation of 
Kubrick has an unjust effect. A plaintiff will be required to bring 
suit before causation in order to avoid the risk of having his suit 
barred. As stated in Stoleson, a plaintiff who seeks legal advice 
on the mere suspicion of the cause of injury, will be informed 
that he has no cause of action.1I4 As a result of Davis, a plaintiff 
will be caught in the position of risking suit before he is sure of 
causation, and therefore not having a cause of action, or of seek-
50. 642 F.2d at 332. 
51. 444 U.S. at 118·24. 
52. 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1428. 1439 (1980). 
53. 444 U.S. at 123. 
54. 629 F.2d at 1270. 
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ing to find the cause and risk being barred from bringing suit.1I11 
Susan A. Bush 
III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE 
In other cases last term, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the 
Magistrates Act to allow a trial before a Magistrate, took an ex-
pansive view of the principal of finality, adopted a new rule on 
the timeliness of certain civil appeals, and allowed the district 
court a measure of concurrent jurisdiction. 
A. MAGISTRATE'S PRE-AMENDMENT AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A 
TRIAL ON THE MERITS 
In Coolidge v. Schooner California,l the Ninth Circuit held 
that the 1976 version of the Magistrates Act,· authorized a mag-
istrate, with the consent of the parties, to conduct a trial on the 
merits-provided the parties are given an opportunity to submit 
objections to the district judge for a de novo review.' 
In Coolidge, a trial was held before a magistrate with the 
consent of the parties. Soon after, the magistrate issued his 
opinion, setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The plaintiff then submitted objections to the findings but was 
informed by the Clerk of the District Court that because the 
55. For a general discussion of the problems aasociated with maas immunization 
programs and liability for injuries, see Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immuniza-
tion PrograT1l8: Lessons from the Polio and Flu Epi&odes, 65 CALI'. L. REV. 754 (1977). 
1. 637 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Kilkenny, J.; the other panel members were 
Hug, J. and Van Dusen, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. The Magistrates Act states: "A magistrate may be aasigned such additional duties 
as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and Laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C . 
. § 636(b)(3) (1976). 
3. 637 F.2d at 1326. In a footnote, the panel appears to have adopted the view that 
only those portions of the magistrate's opinion to which objections are raised require a 
de novo review. Id. n.5. See Calderon v. Waco Lighthouse for the Blind, 630 F.2d 352, 
355-56 (5th Cir. 1980). 
Section 636 was amended in 1979, establishing procedures for a magistrate to "con-
duct any or all proceedings in a ... civil matter and order the entry of judgment .... " 
Act of Oct. 10, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2,93 Stat. 643 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(l) 
(Supp. III 1979». 
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parties had consented to a trial by the magistrate, they had no 
right to submit objections to the findings.· The district judge, 
apparently without any review of the proceedings, issued his 
judgment U[b]ased on the Court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law.'" 
Under section 636(b)(I)(B) of the Magistrates Act, U[a] 
judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, in-
cluding evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the 
court proposed findings of facts and recommendations for the 
disposition by the judge of the court. . . . u. The 1976 version of 
the Act required the magistrate to mail copies of his or her pro-
posed findings to all parties. Furthermore, 
[w]ithin ten days after being served with a copy, 
any party may serve and file written objections to 
such proposed findings and recommenda-
tions .... 
A judge of the court shall make a de novo de-
termination of those portions of the report or 
specified proposed findings or recommendations 
to which objection is made . . . .' 
Although the present version of the Magistrates Act clearly 
gives magistrates jurisdiction to decide civil cases with the con-
sent of the parties,' the Ninth Circuit panel noted that courts 
disagreed as to the extent of permissible magistrate jurisdiction 
prior to the 1979 amendment.-
In Muhich v. Allen,IO the Seventh Circuit used a two-step 
approach to review the Magistrates Act. First, the court deter-
mined that section 636 of the Act, along with local rules of court, 
authorized magistrates to conduct civil trials with the consent of 
the parties. Second, the court found any constitutional or statu-
tory objections to granting magistrates this power cured by the 
de novo review of a district court judge.l1 In Muhich, the review 
was proper where it covered "proceedings held before the magis-
4. 637 F.2d at 1323. 
5.Id. 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(B) (1976). 
7.Id. 
S. For text of the present version, see note 3 supra. 
9. See generally 637 F.2d at 1324 n.3 and cases cited therein. 
10. 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979). 
11. Id. at 1250-51. 
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trates ... and the objections, if any, of the parties filed thereto 
"11 
The Ninth Circuit also relied on the Fifth Circuit decision 
in Calderon v. Waco Lighthouse for the Blind. lI In Calderon, 
the Fifth Circuit found that "consensual references to a magis-
trate for trial on the merits were permitted" under section 
636(b)(3) of the Act.l. The Fifth Circuit also required the dis-
trict court to conduct a de novo determination of any portions of 
the magistrate's findings to which objections are raised.1I 
The Ninth Circuit held that under section 636(b)(3) a mag-
istrate has authority to conduct a civil trial with the consent of 
the parties, thereby adopting the view of the Fifth and Seventh 
Circuits. The court also concluded that because the Magistrate 
Act was to aid the district court in making decisions, "the par-
ties must be given an opportunity to submit objections to the 
district judge and the judge must make a de novo review."lt Ap-
plying this conclusion to the facts at hand, the court remanded 
the case for a de novo review of the magistrate's opinion and the 
plaintiff's objections. I., 
While the court's decision in Coolidge is a well-reasoned in-
terpretation of the intent of section 636 of the Magistrate Act, 
its value is limited to those cases which must interpret the Act 
prior to the 1979 amendment. In 1979, Congress added subsec-
tion (c) which clearly vests magistrates with the power to con-
duct civil trials and enter judgments with the consent of the 
parties.11 
B. APPEALABILITY OP A NON-FINAL ORDER 
In Anderson v. Allstate Insurance CO.,lt the Ninth Circuit 
held that even though an appeal is taken from a district court 
12. rd. at 1262. 
13. 630 F.2d 362 (6th Cir. 1980). 
14. rd. at 355. 
16. rd. at 356. 
16. 637 F.2d at 1325·26. 
17. rd. at 1327. 
18. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(I) (Supp. III 1979). 
19. 630 F.2d 677 (1980) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were Alarcon, J. 
and Tuttle, J., sitting by designation). 
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order which is not final pursuant to section 1291 of Title 28,10 
and no interlocutory certificate is acquired under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,u the appellate court could treat the 
orders appealed from as final orders when all the remaining 
claims were disposed of subsequently. 
The plaintiffs, a chiropracter and one of his employees, sued 
several insurance companies and Does 1 through 5012 in state 
court for violating plaintiff's first amendment rights, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, and unlawful interference with 
business relationships.lIS Fifteen months later, in January 1978, 
the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint adding three new 
defendants, but retaining the original Does 1 through 50.24 
On April 11, 1979, the defendants' petition for removal to 
federal district court was granted. III On May 17, 1979, the three 
new defendants moved to dismiss· on the ground that the statute 
of limitations had run, since they were added as new defendants 
and not Does.2e On June 5, the district court judge dismissed the 
action with prejudice with respect to the three defendants added 
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) states: "The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the districts of the United States .... " 
21. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an ac-
tion ... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon 
an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
FED. R. CIY. P. 54(b). 
22. The California Code of Civil Procedure allows the use of fictitiously named de-
fendants for the purpose of protecting the statute of limitations as to those parties. CAL. 
CIY. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 1979). 
23. 630 F.2d at 679. Plaintiffs had advised their patients to seek legal counsel before 
settling claims with the defendant insurance companies. Plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dants therefore "made false and fraudulent representations to patients and prospective 
patients about the quality of [plaintiff's] practice, told patients and prospective patients 
that [defendants] would not pay for [plaintiff's] services; and threatened to terminate 
patient's policies .... " 1d. at 684. 
24. 1d. at 679. 
25. On April 24, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss their federal cause of action. Be-
cause this was almost two weeks after the case had been removed to federal Court and 
the state court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the federal claim, the district court retained 
its jurisdiction to hear the case. 1d. at 680. 
26. The statute of limitations for malicious prosecution and abuse of process is one 
year. CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 340(30) (West 1979). Tortious interference with business 
relations has a two-year statute. 1d. § 339(1). 
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in the amended complaint. I'!' 
The plaintiffs then attempted to serve these same three de-
fendants as Does. The defendants moved to strike the amended 
complaint and for sanctions against plaintiff's counsel for abuse 
of process.la The district court granted these motions. The 
plaintiff appealed all three district court rulings. Subsequent to 
filing the appeal, the district court dismissed the federal cause of 
action as to the remaining defendants and remanded the state 
claims to the California courts. III 
The Ninth Circuit, in granting itself jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal, based its decision on policy grounds stating: "There is no 
danger of piecemeal appeal confronting us if we find jurisdiction 
here, for nothing else remains in the federal COurts."IO Using 
finality as a basis, the court extended the holdings of several 
cases from other circuits. These cases had allowed appellate re-
view of orders which only partially adjudicated the issues when 
the remaining claims were disposed of subsequently. 11 The panel 
noted that the Supreme Court has mandated that "practical, not 
technical, considerations are to govern the application of princi-
ples of finality."11 Finally, the court examined two previous 
Ninth Circuit decisions that had granted appeals from non-final 
orders of dismissal when the district court had subsequently en-
tered judgment based on those orders. II 
C. A "WORKABLE RULE" POR DETERMINING WHO IS AN OFFICER 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
In Wallace v. Chappell," the Ninth Circuit held that when-
ever an action arises from government activities, the sixty day 
period for the filing of an appeal under Federal Rule of Appel-
27. 630 F.2d at 680. 
28.1d. 
29.1d. 
30. Id. at 681. 
31. Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); FrankCort Oil 
Co. v. Snarkard, 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 920 (1960). 
32. 630 F.2d at 680 (quoting Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 
(5th Cir. 1973». See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964). 
33. 630 F.2d at 681 (explaining Ruby v. Secretary oC Navy, 365 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 
1966) (en bane), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011 (1967); Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 346 
F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1966». 
34. 637 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam; Poole, J., di88enting). 
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late Procedure 4(a)SII will apply if the defendants were acting 
under either color of office,se color of law or unlawful authority,S7 
or any party in the case was represented by a government 
attorney. ae 
The Wallace plaintiffs, United States Naval personnel, 
brought suit against their superior officers for alleged racial dis-
crimination. ae The plaintiffs sued the defendants as individual 
officers, apparently to avoid the defenses available to military 
officers acting in the line of duty.40 The district court dismissed 
the action and the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal thirty-
five days after the district court entered final judgment.u Rule 
4(a)(1) requires that in such cases an appeal must be filed within 
thirty days, but that if the United States, an officer or agency 
thereof is involved, notice of appeal may be filed within sixty 
days. The issue on appeal was whether the notice of appeal was 
timely under Rule 4(a). 
The former rule in the Ninth Circuit had been that to pre-
vent inconsistent positions, "a plaintiff who contended (in order 
to avoid a defense of immunity) that the government agent was 
acting as a private citizen, could not, upon appeal, contend that 
the defendant was a government officer on government business 
35. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(l) requires a notice of appeal to be filed with the district 
court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. This requirement is extended to 60 days 
when "the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party." Id. 
36. "An act under color of office is an act of an officer who claims authority to do . 
the act by reason of his office when the office does not confer on him any such author-
ity." 637 F.2d at 1348 n.6 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DlcnONARY 241 (5th ed. 1979)). "For an 
act of a government officer to be under color of office. the act must have some rational 
connection with his official position." 637 F.2d at 1348 n.6 (quoting Arthur v. Fry. 300 F. 
Supp. 620. 622 (E.D. Tenn. 1969)). 
37. Color of law is "the appearance or semblance. without the substance of legal 
rights .... " 637 F.2d at 1348 n.7 (quoting BLACK'S LAw D1cnONARY (5th ed. 1979)). 
The court also noted that color of law exists when acts by private individuals become 
"'so closely intertwined' with the government. that private action becomes 'state ac-
tion· ... 637 F.2d at 1348 n.7 (quoting Smith v. Young Men's Christian Aas·n. 462 F.2d 
643. 647 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
38. 637 F.2d at 1346. 
39. Plaintiffs based their claim on two statutes. One. § 1985. prohibits conspiracies 
to interfere with civil rights and conspiracies to prevent an officer of the United States 
from performing his or her duties. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976). The other. § 1341. vests 
original jurisdiction in the district court for violations of § 1985 or for other relief under 
an Act of Congress for the protection of civil rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). 
40. 637 F.2d at 1346. 
41. [d. 
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in order to avail himself of the 60-day rule."n 
The Wallace panel found the former rule created confusion 
in that the time for appeal depended on the wording of the 
pleadings.n In addition, the court adjudged the defendants to 
have acted inconsistently by arguing their official status in dis-
trict court and their individual status for the purpose of apply-
ing Rule 4(a)." 
The defendants argued that Hare v. Hurwitz'" required the 
court to examine the purpose of Rule 4(a), which was to allow 
cases against government agencies or officers to be routed to the 
officials responsible for deciding whether to appeal.,a Applying 
Hare to the present case, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to 
sixty days under Rule 4(a). The court preferred a liberal reading 
of Rule 4(a) to eliminate uncertainty. However, because Con-
gress intended the words "officers of the United States to be 
read in context with their activities, authority, and duties,"" a 
different approach was necessary. 
In formulating its new rule, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that "[a] workable rule would be one that looks to who repre-
sents the parties and the relationship of the parties to each 
other and to the government during the course of the conduct 
that gave rise to the action."'s Looking at the defendants' rela-
tionship to the government, the Wallace panel denied the defen-
dants' motion to dismiss and remanded the case for oral argu-
ment on the merits. 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Poole argued that it was both 
unfair to allow the plaintiff to adopt inconsistent positions and 
42. ld. at 1347 (citing Michaels v. Chappell, 279 F.2d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. 
denied, 366 U.S. 940 (1961». 
43. 637 F.2d at 1347. 
44. rd. n.2. 
45. 248 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1957). 
46. 637 F.2d at 1347. 
47. rd. 
48. ld. at 1348. The court noted that the Department of Juatice must conduct litiga-
tion involving officers or agencies of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1976). In addi-
tion, a federal employee sued as an individual can request representation by the Depart-
ment of Justice if it appears that the employee's activities were within the scope of 
employment. rd. § 5O.15(a). 
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unnecessary to overule Michaels v. Chappell.·t The proper pro-
cedure, according to the dissent, would have been for the Ninth 
Circuit to dismiss the appeal and remand the action for a deter-
mination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)" of 
whether to extend the time for appeal. III 
49. 279 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 940 (1961). In Michaels, the 
Ninth Circuit enunciated the former rule. For a discussion of this rule, see text accompa-
nying note 42 supra. 
50. Rule 6O(b) allows the district court to extend the time for filing notice of appeal 
if excusable neglect or good cause is shown. FEn. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
51. 637 F.2d at 1349. 
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